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What is Central and Eastern Europe?
Central and Eastern Europe has various historical-geographical definitions. In my
interpretation it is a historical unit east from the 19th meridian, or along the River
Elbe, that divides Europe in half. During the second half of the 20th century it was
the “Soviet Bloc”; and currently, it is the region of the “transforming” countries.
The concept of two Europes – West and East – is as old as modern historiography.
Leopold von Ranke already in the early 19th century differentiated between the
peoples and histories of the two halves of the continent (Ranke, [1824] 1909).
Jenõ Szûcs noted that the River Elbe separated these two parts of Europe in 815,
when that was the eastern border of the Christian-feudal Carolingian Empire,
markedly different from the pagan, nomadic east. Accidentally, in 1945, the
American and Russian armies met at the River Elbe and, soon created two oppos-
ing world systems on either side of it (Szûcs, 1983).
Indeed, Central and Eastern Europe shares important characteristics. Com-
pared to the West, history ‘began’ here half a millennium later, only in the
9th–10th centuries when the first permanent states were established, Christianity,
feudal institutions, noble privileges, serfdom, private ownership, and land cultiva-
tion were introduced. Even in the 13th to the 15th centuries, this entire region re-
mained a kind of ‘frontier’ (N. Berend, 2001), open to Asian invasions and Mon-
gol and Ottoman occupations. Between the 15th and 19th centuries, the region
could not follow the rise of the modern, merchant, industrializing Western capital-
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ism. Instead it became the raw material and food-supplying periphery,
re-feudalized in the capitalist world system (Wallerstein, 1974).
The social fabric, in contrast to the Western bourgeois society with its “disap-
pearing” peasantry, majority working class, and modern entrepreneurial elite, pre-
served the traditional elements, old social layers and structures characterized a
“Dual Society” while modern, mostly non-indigenous, German and Jewish mid-
dle class, and a small working class began emerging. In the Balkans, an almost en-
tirely peasant, “incomplete”, or elite-less society existed where bureaucratic-mili-
tary elite filled the gap.
Oscar Jászi (1964) called this area the “unfinished part of Europe” where na-
tion building did not follow the Western pattern and actually was finishing in the
present. At the beginning of the 19th century, three multi national empires domi-
nated the area, in the early 20th century eight states existed in the region, while in
the early 21st century, already twenty-eight.
The Development Level of the Region at the End of the Long-19th Century
Until the early-20th century, this region remained the agricultural half of Europe
where the infrastructure and income level – GDP per capita – hardly reached more
than one-third to one-half of the West European core’s. If we add the level of hu-
man capital, the health and educational standard of the region compared to the
Western core, we get the full picture of Central and eastern European backward-
ness: life expectancy at birth before World War I was between 35–40 years, 10–15
years less than in the West. Educational level is well characterized that illiteracy,
virtually disappeared in the West still represented 1/3 to 2/3 of the population.
The generalization of the Central and Eastern Europe characteristics, however,
requires some further qualification. As Tables 1–3 reflect, all the comparisons
show economic and social backwardness. However, in a broader European rela-
tionship the picture is much less dark. Before World War I, we can differentiate
among four European regions regarding the level of economic development. 1)
The advanced, industrialized, modernized Western Europe, including the western
provinces of Austria-Hungary and North Italy. 2) At the other end of the spectrum
the region of failed modernization in the Balkans and the borderlands of Aus-
tria-Hungary. 3) Another highly pre-industrial region, but with advanced indus-
trial pockets in Russia, Spain, Portugal and South Italy. 4) At last, our region un-
der investigation was a semi-successful modernizer. Central Europe, i.e. Poland,
Hungary, together with the Baltic area, Finland and Ireland, emerged on the road
of modernization and developed an agricultural-industrial structure. The area of
investigation thus occupied a medium level of development. Interesting to note:
the semi-successful modernizer countries were not independent nation states, but
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parts of the multinational British, Russian, or Habsburg empires. All of Finland,
the Baltic region, Ireland, Poland and Hungary profited from the huge imperial
markets, including their financial markets (Berend, 2011, forthcoming). As recent
research documented, independent developing countries received much less capi-
tal, and had to pay much higher interest rates for it (Fergusson and Schularik,
2006, 297; Flandreau and Flores, 2009, 679).1
The Development Level of the Region at the End of the Short-20th Century
In the “short-20th century” between 1913 and 1989, Central and Eastern Europe
made desperate attempts to industrialize and modernize. That was the age of bitter
revolts on the European peripheries. Learning the lessons from the successful
German war economic regime during the Great War, all of the peripheries intro-
duced newly invented alternative, state dictated economic regimes to replace lib-
eral, free trade, export-led policies. Fascist-authoritarian economic dirigisme be-
came dominant in Mediterranean Europe, including Italy, Spain, Portugal, and
Greece; while the world first non-market, centrally planned economy wanted ele-
vating Russia from lagging behind the West by 50–100 years to reach its eco-
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Table 1. Development level of the railroads in 1911
(Berend and Ránki, 1982, 100)
Region Land area /1 km Length of Weight of transported No. of railway
railroad railroad/100,000 goods/100,000 journeys/
(in sq km) inhabitants inhabitants inhabitants
(in 100,000 tons)
European Core 10.14 90.2 8.18 21.9
C&E E 20.49 50.4 1.59 1.7
Table 2. Employment of the active population by sectors in 1913
(Based on Broadberry and O’Rourke, 2010, 61, 70; Berend and Ránki, 1982, 159)
Region Agriculture Industry Services Industrialization/capita*
North West Europe 20.9 39.5 39.6 55
C&E E 69.8 18.3 11.9 18
*Great Britain in 1900 = 100
Table 3. GDP per capita in 1913
(Maddison, 1995, 228)
Region GDP/capita (in 1990 dollar) %
Western Europe 3,704 100
Central and Eastern Europe 1,690 45.6
nomic level in 10 years as Stalin declared in 1931. The countries of the region that
regained independence after World War I turned to economic nationalism, high
protective tariffs and strong state interventionism in their effort to catch-up with
the West that failed before the war when they followed free trade and export-led
industrialization policy.
The newly independent but radically “redesigned” (Poland, Hungary, and Ro-
mania) and partly newly created countries (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia)
needed two decades between the wars to somewhat adjust to the new situation
among their new borders. Moreover, those decades were pretty depressed years
with long period of economic chaos in the immediate postwar years with high in-
flation, than a devastating Great Depression that hit hard the agricultural and in-
debted countries. Economic growth characterized the short years of the second
half of the 1920s and then the later 1930s, thus economic growth slowed down
significantly. None of the countries of the region succeeded in industrialization.
They preserved, in the best case, their agricultural-industrial structure.
Central and Eastern Europe definitely became more self-sufficient, especially
in industrial consumer good production such as textile, leather, paper, etc. Their
progress in developing certain industrial sectors explains the slow advance and
reaching of somewhat more than half of the Western economic level.
This progress nevertheless was rather ambivalent since the advance happened
in internationally obsolete and already declining branches. The region, in other
words, went against the main stream of modern structural changes. Hungary, for
example, increased its textile and paper output by four-times in the interwar de-
cades, and instead of importing 70 percent of its consumed textile goods (in
1913), entirely covered domestic consumption by the 1930s. Bulgaria became 80
percent self-sufficient in covering its industrial consumer good consumption.
Modern engineering, car, and chemical industries, on the other hand – except a
few modern factories in some of the countries – had remained behind, or non-exis-
tent. Most of the modern sectors were financed by foreign investments before
World War I, and capital inflow to the region except a few years in the second half
of the 1920s, stopped. Modern technology import also dramatically declined. In
spite of the striking grain crisis in the period, agricultural output was not diversi-
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Table 4. GDP per capita, 1913–50
(Maddison, 1995, 228)
Year Western Europe Central and Eastern C-E-E in %
(23 countries) Europe (9 countries) of W-E
1913 3,704 1,690 45.6
1950 5,126 2,631 51.3
fied and one-sided grain cultivation remained virtually unchanged. Traditional
agricultural and raw material export decreased only from 60 percent to 59 percent
in Hungary, remained unchanged, 76 percent in Poland, while in Yugoslavia and
Romania, their share were 96 percent and 83 percent, respectively, before World
War II.
Rigid social hierarchy and class society, obsolete social characteristics, exclu-
sion of the peasantry from the society blocking social mobility, and preserving the
noble-gentry value system remained almost untouched. Education, in spite of
spreading literacy, remained a stage behind the West because secondary educa-
tion was elitist and extremely limited, in the best case between 5 percent and 10
percent of the generation, while higher education enrolled only 1 percent–1.5 per-
cent of the age group.
The second half of the short 20th century was the period of communist eco-
nomic experiment throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The policy of forced
capital accumulation and industrialization, the brutal method that uprooted the
peasantry from their land, and the authoritarian political regimes definitely had
certain success in transforming the region. Most notably, the often cast like social
hierarchy was eliminated and – in the first few decades – an unprecedented social
mobility and a real educational revolution modernized the society. Secondary ed-
ucation became virtually general, and higher education enrolled about 15 percent
of the given age group. However, the content and structure of education, its’ over
specialization, practical, and vocational orientation did not follow modern educa-
tional trends.
Increased capital accumulation from the interwar average 6 percent of the GDP
jumped to 20–25 percent of it and with massive investments, the countries of the
region, after the slow interwar decades, generated the highest economic growth of
3.9 percent per annum, i.e., the fastest growth to date, and became industrialized
during the 1960–70s. The isolated Soviet Bloc, however, created severe obstacles
for real modernization. The area, as all of the peripheral regions, has never pio-
neered technological inventions and needed technology import. The Cold War
era, however, made technology transfer impossible because the Western ban of
technology and know how export, the strict CoCom list did not allow following
the new communication revolution that revolutionized the entire communication,
services, and industry. With tremendous sacrifices of the population, Central and
Eastern Europe, thus, at the end, was unable to adjust to the structural requirement
of the age and reproduced backwardness in a different form. The computer revo-
lution stopped at the borders of the region and the new high- and medium-high
tech industries did not develop. Meanwhile, postwar Western Europe also experi-
enced its unique prosperity and extremely rapid economic growth. This became
characteristic both in the par excellence West and also for the former Mediterra-
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nean peripheries that had the highest growth rate in the continent and started join-
ing the core.
From the mid-1970s, after the Oil Crisis and the emerging new structural crisis,
rapid growth stopped in the region. Moreover, a serious indebtedness crisis
emerged, because all of the communist countries tried to assure political stability
by overbridging the crisis ridden years with foreign credits to keep full employ-
ment and living standard intact. The regions indebtedness increased from $6 bil-
lion to $100 billion in a few years, and about 80 percent of the credits were con-
sumed. Repayment consequently became more and more difficult, and some of
the countries became insolvent and asked for rescheduling repayments. Rapid
growth was replaced by near stagnation, and during the last years of the 1980s,
even decline in some of the countries. Altogether, in spite of the undoubtedly im-
portant social and educational modernization, the most lasting achievement of the
communist experiment, in spite of successful and rapid industrialization, Central
and Eastern Europe remained on the periphery of the continent, unable to catch-up
with the West, moreover, even sliding further behind (Berend, 2009).
Prospects: Central and Eastern Europe’s Development
in the 21st Century
Post-communist transformation, at the immediate post-1989 period, as Joseph
Stiglitz called it, was “mismanaged” (Stiglitz, 2003) and a neo-liberal,
“one-size-fit-all” strait jacket was virtually forced to the entire region. The West
applauded the ill-advised “shock therapy” and the sudden opening, market and
price liberalization of the countries and a fast privatization attempt led to a tragic
decline of 20–25 percent of the GDP, about 50 percent decrease of agricultural
and 20 percent to 30 percent decline of industrial output.
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Table 5. Comparative economic growth, 1950–92*
(Maddison, 2001, 186; 1995, 201)
Region GDP/capita, GDP/capita, Growth rate, Growth rate,
1950 % 1992 % 1950–73 1973–92
Western Europe 5,126 100 17,387 100 4.8 2.0
Central and East Europe 2,631 51.3 4,665 37.3 3.79 –0.7
* Because a great part, although not the entire decline after the collapse of communism was a
consequence of the previous “misdevelopment”, the closing year in this table is not 1989, but
1992.
The region, however, immediately received assistance from the West. The Eu-
ropean Union soon accepted the application of several of the former communist
countries, including former Soviet republics, and eight Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries became member of the European Union in 2004, and then two
more in 2007. All of these countries became members of the NATO, and the new
political arrangement stabilized the political and international situation of the re-
gion. Moreover, from the years of European Union candidacy, financial assis-
tance started inflow to the region that reached one-third of the budget of the Euro-
pean Union. This went hand in hand with a huge inflow of foreign direct invest-
ments and credits. The entire banking sector was newly created by more than 80
percent foreign participation, and the leading multinational companies estab-
lished subsidiaries in the modern high- and medium-high tech sectors, initiated re-
search and development and brought the best modern technology into the region.
Between 1989 and 2004, $161,255 million capital flowed in to Central Europe
and the Baltic area, and another $41,903 million to the Balkans (EBRD, 2005, 19).
Labor productivity and economic growth gained a new impulse and went hand in
hand with a radical structural modernization.
Although the role of agriculture and industry in the GDP and employment are
still 2.5–3 times and 1.2 times, retrospectively, bigger than in the West, while the
service sector is still somewhat smaller than in the West, in spite of these legacy of
the past, the sectoral structure of the economy, first time in the history of the re-
gion, became quite similar to the Western structure.
Labor productivity the best mirror of technological and managerial develop-
ment, as well as work ethic, was $5–7 per hour in Central and Eastern Europe, thus
only one-quarter to one-third of the Western level of $25–28 in 1990. During the
transformation years when the European Union reached an average 1.4 percent
annual increase of productivity, the transforming countries had 3–4 percent in-
crease, i.e., their productivity level in the various countries of the region increased
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Table 6. Structural changes after the regime change, 2005
(Economist, 2006)
Agriculture Industry Services
Region % of % of % of % of % of % of
GDP employment GDP employment GDP employment
West Europe* 2.0 4.4 27.0 31.2 70.0 66
Eastern** Europe 4.9 12.7 32.8 36.7 62.3 56
East in % of West 2.45 2.89 1.28 1.18 0.91 0.85
* European Union 15 or Eurozone; ** 9 countries: all of the Central European and Baltic countries
plus Romania.
at least by 50 percent, or doubled and even tripled, thus reached about half of the
Western productivity level.
After the severe decline in the first transformation years, the region’s economy
gradually recuperated: from 1993 economic growth returned and between 1993
and 2003, reached 4–5 percent per year in Central Europe and the Baltic area.
While the region’s per capita GDP reached only 37 percent of the West European
level in 1992, by 2005, reached its 46 percent (virtually the same level as in 1973,
and exactly the same as in 1913). Central Europe reached the 1989 per capita GDP
level by 2000, and surpassed that by 50 percent by 2010. The entire Soviet Bloc,
however, recovered the 1989 level only by 2010. Meanwhile income differences
significantly increased:
Looking back to the last two centuries, the picture is rather depressing. In rela-
tive terms, comparing to Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe is far be-
hind its 1820 relative level, and could not reach the 1870 relative level either.
Varying calculations reflect less than half or even hardly more than one-third of
the Western level in Central and Eastern European by 2005:
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Table 7. Income inequality (Gini index*)
(Based on Broadberry and O’Rourke, 2010, 398)
Region 1985 2000
Germany, France, Sweden and the Netherlands 25.5 29.3
Central and Eastern Europe (8 countries) 22.1 31.2
Russia 23.8 45.6
Britain and Italy 29.5 36.0
* The Gini Index = 0, if everybody has the same income, 100 if one person gets all of the income
of a country.
Table 8. GDP/capita in Central and Eastern Europe (9 countries)
in % of West Europe (23 countries)
(Teodorovich et al., 2005, 326; Maddison, 1995, 228;
Broadberry and O’Rourke, 2010, 299, 302)
East in % of West Europe
Teodorovich and Maddison Broadberry and O’Rourke
59 57
51 48
46 49
51 46
47 44
40 –
39 –
46 35
Forecasts for the Coming Decades
A promising one-, one-and-half decades of gradual catching-up period with the
West, faster growth rates and productivity increase, stopped in 2007–09. The fi-
nancial crisis hit the world, Europe, including the transforming countries. Eco-
nomic growth, however is returning to the world. What would the future bring to
Central and Eastern Europe? According to one of the most authentic quantifiers,
Angus Maddison, Central Europe may reach an annual 1.79 percent annual
growth between 2003 and 2030, while Western Europe will have 1.75 percent. If
this is the case, the existing gap would hardly change and Central and Eastern Eu-
rope remains on the European periphery. Europe as a whole, and Central and East-
ern Europe is losing its share from the world economy because of the much faster
rising new Asian and overseas economies. Maddison’s calculation shows a con-
tinuous sharp European decline:
A more realistic forecast by Nicholas Crafts, however, calculates 4 percent
long-term economic growth per year in Central and Eastern Europe, while – ac-
cording to the same calculations – the West also continues with more or less the
same growth rate as before 2008, i.e., about 2 percent. In this case the catching-up
process may continue but requires at least the greatest part of the 21st century
(Crafts, 2006, 40).
In full agreement with Grzegorz Kolodko, one has to add: there is not one sin-
gle future for Central and Eastern Europe. Kolodko differentiates among four pos-
sible paths: 1) vanguard group of a very few countries: 7.5 percent annual growth;
2) Bulk of Central Europe 3–4 percent; 3) a group of 2–3 percent annual growth;
and at last, 4) some Balkan countries with less than 2 percent growth (Kolodko,
2001). In this case, a small part of the region will catch-up with the West relatively
fast, while some parts of the region will be unable to get closer to the West, more-
over, some countries may decline further back.
The 2008–10 economic crisis calls the attention for cautious forecasts. The de-
pressing experience and fragility of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, coun-
tries that started emerging from the peripheries from the 1970s–80s and exhibited
modern history’s most impressing catching-up success, all of a sudden sharply de-
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Table 9. Shares from the world’s GDP
(Maddison, 2007, 340)
Regions 1820 1870 1950 1973 2003 2030
West Europe 23.0 33.1 26.2 25.6 19.2 13.0
East Europe 3.6 4.5 3.5 3.4 1.9 1.3
clined because the dualistic character of the transforming countries unveiled the
weakness of the genuinely domestic sectors. A third of a century is not a long pe-
riod in historical measures.
Historical forecasts, however, are always the extrapolation of existing trends,
while history is a complex process of continuity and change. Historians, in the
end, are not futurologists.
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1 Independent developing countries had 180 basis point higher interest rates than British colo-
nies in India and Africa. Even backward, autocratic empires such as the Russian and Ottoman
were preferred borrowers “precisely because they were strong… [and] credible underwriters
came to monopolize the market for good sovereign debt”.
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